The rise of South–South trade and its effect on global CO2 emissions by Meng, Jing et al.
ARTICLE
The rise of South–South trade and its effect on
global CO2 emissions
Jing Meng 1,2,3, Zhifu Mi 2,4, Dabo Guan 2,5, Jiashuo Li6, Shu Tao 3, Yuan Li2,7,
Kuishuang Feng 8, Junfeng Liu3, Zhu Liu 5,9, Xuejun Wang3, Qiang Zhang5 & Steven J. Davis10
Economic globalization and concomitant growth in international trade since the late 1990s
have profoundly reorganized global production activities and related CO2 emissions. Here we
show trade among developing nations (i.e., South–South trade) has more than doubled
between 2004 and 2011, which reﬂects a new phase of globalization. Some production
activities are relocating from China and India to other developing countries, particularly raw
materials and intermediate goods production in energy-intensive sectors. In turn, the growth
of CO2 emissions embodied in Chinese exports has slowed or reversed, while the emissions
embodied in exports from less-developed regions such as Vietnam and Bangladesh have
surged. Although China’s emissions may be peaking, ever more complex supply chains are
distributing energy-intensive industries and their CO2 emissions throughout the global South.
This trend may seriously undermine international efforts to reduce global emissions that
increasingly rely on rallying voluntary contributions of more, smaller, and less-developed
nations.
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International trade increased >50% from 2005 to 2015, with~60% of the increase tied to rising exports from developingcountries1, which is also known as Global South2. Yet over the
same period, South–South trade (i.e., among developing coun-
tries) has grown even faster—more than tripling—to reach 57% of
all developing country exports (US$9.3 trillion) in 20143. The
rapid growth in South–South trade reﬂects a fragmenting of
global supply chains whereby early production stages of many
industries have relocated from countries like China and India to
lower-wage economies4, 5, a trend that has accelerated since the
global ﬁnancial crisis in 20086. A host of new institutions such as
the South–South Cooperation Fund, China’s Belt and Road
Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank7–10 have
also emerged to support trade and investments among developing
nations, indicating that strong growth in South–South trade will
continue in the future.
In addition to their important implications for global economic
development, these trends will affect the magnitude and regional
distribution of future global CO2 emissions11. Whereas previous
studies have focused on the offshoring of production activities
and emissions from developed countries to developing coun-
tries12–14, relatively little attention has been speciﬁcally paid to
the rapid rise of South–South trade since the 2008–2009 global
ﬁnancial crisis. Yet the period since 2009 has also witnessed
decreases in Chinese coal consumption that underpin a leveling
off of global CO2 emissions15, as well as the forging of the Paris
Agreement whereby nations are determining their contributions
to the global effort to reduce CO2 emissions16. Given the
immense importance of these developments in determining the
future global climate, it seems almost equally important to
understand how South–South trade may be contributing to
changing economic production and structure, and how a diffu-
sion of emissions might affect the efﬁcacy of the Paris Agreement.
To address these questions, here we use the latest released
GTAP data to quantify the effects of South–South trade on
regional and sectoral CO2 emissions between 2004 and 2011. In
summary, we use international trade and CO2 emissions data
from 2004, 2007 and 2011 to track emissions related to both
intermediate and ﬁnal goods and services from 57 industry sec-
tors that are traded among 129 regions (101 regions are indivi-
dual countries)17. To facilitate presentation, we aggregate results
into ten regions according to the geographical proximity and level
of economic development. These include six developing regions
of the global South: China, India, Middle East and North Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Other
Asia and Paciﬁc; and other (mostly developed) regions of U.S.-
North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, and developed Asia-Paciﬁc regions12, 18–20. Our
ﬁndings show that some production activities are relocating from
China and India to other developing regions, particularly raw
materials and intermediate goods production in energy-intensive
sectors. The trend implies that complex supply chains are dis-
tributing energy-intensive industries and their CO2 emissions
throughout the global South.
Results
Growth in emissions embodied in South–South trade
2004–2011. In total, CO2 emissions embodied in goods and
services exported from developing countries increased by 46%
between 2004 and 2011, from 2.2 Gt to 3.3 Gt (Supplementary
Table 1). Although a substantial and growing quantity of these
emissions were embodied in exports to developed regions (1.8 Gt
in 2004 and 2.2 Gt in 2011, growing by an average of 2.9% per
year), the emissions embodied in South–South trade increased
much more rapidly: from 0.47 Gt in 2004 to 1.1 Gt in 2011 (1.33%
per year). The growth is mainly driven by the increasing export
volume (i.e., exports per capita (0.75 Gt) and population (0.07
Gt)), and partly offset by decline in emission intensity (0.1 Gt).
The shading of regions in Fig. 1 indicates the magnitude of net
imports (reds) or net exports (blue) embodied in South–South
trade in each year 2004, 2007, and 2011. Arrows in the ﬁgure
represent the ten largest South–South ﬂuxes of embodied
emissions in 2004, 2007, and 2011 (Fig. 1a, b, c, respectively).
Although many regions in the global South became larger net
importers over the period, the magnitude of carbon embodied in
exports between the developing regions also increases, including
China’s exports to all other developing regions, but also (1)
Middle East and North Africa’s exports to China, (2) India’s
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and (3) Other Asia
and Paciﬁc’s exports to China (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Fig. 1).
In other words, emissions embodied in both imports and
exports have signiﬁcantly increased in South–South trade during
2004–2011.
In the period concerned, more than half of the growth in
emissions embodied in South–South trade were related to exports
from China to other developing regions, which grew by 199% (see
Supplementary Fig. 1) or 380 million tonnes (Mt). This amount is
comparable to United Kingdom’s annual CO2 emission in 2016.
China’s exports to India accelerated most rapidly, with an average
growth rate of 23% per year. The growth of export per capita in
China would have increased exported emissions by 0.16 Gt
during 2004–2007 and 0.27 Gt during 2007–2011 if other factors
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Fig. 1 Changes in net emissions embodied in South–South trade and largest
South–South transfers. Shading indicates regional differences between
emissions embodied in imports and exports (i.e., net emissions embodied in
trade) with net exporters blue and net importers red. Arrows in each panel
show the ten largest South–South transfers of embodied emissions in 2004
(a), 2007 (b), and 2011 (c)
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were constant (Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 2). The main
decelerator was emission intensity from 2004 to 2007, which
would have decreased China’s export emissions to developing
regions by 0.16 Gt (Fig. 2). From 2007 to 2011, production
structure change was the strongest factor, offsetting export
emissions by 0.15 Gt. Over the same period, emissions embodied
in imports to China also increased very rapidly: 137% or 110Mt
that is equivalent to Czech Republic’s carbon emissions in 2015.
In particular, imports from Other Asia and Paciﬁc rose 39% (14
Mt) and imports from Sub-Saharan Africa increased 249% (45
Mt), mainly due to their increasing imports (i.e., exports from
other regions).
Emissions embodied in China’s and India’s trade. As the largest
developing countries in the world by both population and eco-
nomic size, China and India are central to the growing
South–South trade. The different comparative advantages of
developing countries provide grounds for strong economic
exchange. Exports from other developing regions—especially
African countries—to China have been predominantly of
extractive products, minerals and petroleum. China’s resource-
intensive growth model—propelled by heavy infrastructure
spending and its manufacturing machine—requires a large
amount of raw material inputs. Similarly, India imported a range
of inputs from other developing regions such as petroleum from
Latin America and metals from Sub-Saharan Africa. Both
economies export large quantities of manufactured products, and
as the world’s two fastest-growing economies may serve as the
conduits of global demand for manufactured goods for decades to
come.
Figure 3 shows the sectoral breakdown of CO2 emissions
embodied in intermediate and ﬁnal products traded between
developing regions and China (Fig. 3a) and India (Fig. 3b) in
2011. Of the 190Mt CO2 embodied in imports to China from
other developing regions, 93% were embodied in intermediate
products, and in particular mining products (76 Mt) from Sub-
Saharan Africa, India, and Latin America (pale yellow bars in
Fig. 3a). China’s growing appetite for mined raw materials from
Africa (mainly petroleum) led to an increase of 20Mt CO2 in
emissions embodied in China’s imports from Sub-Saharan Africa
in the period 2004–2011, 83% of the total growth from Sub-
Saharan Africa to China (Supplementary Fig. 3). Embodied
emissions in China’s imports from India increased 22Mt over
2004–2011, which was mainly sourced from mining and heavy
industry sectors (Supplementary Fig. 3). Comparing with trade
with Africa, China imported iron ores and other metal ores from
India, which was the third largest iron ores provider to China.
Of the 572Mt CO2 embodied in Chinese exports to other
developing regions, 62% were also embodied in intermediate
products, but consisting largely of manufactured goods such as
machinery (36%). This reﬂects this importance of China’s
manufacturing industry to markets in other developing regions.
China’s exports of machinery and equipment to Sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East
and North Africa increase (Fig. 3) mainly drives emission-
intensive production processes in China, whose role as factory for
the world has been conﬁrmed by previous studies21–23. Although
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Fig. 2 Contributions of different factors to changes in emissions embodied in trade. Bars show the contribution of factors to change in exports during
2004–2007 (a) and 2007–2011 (b), and change in imports during 2004–2007 (c) and 2007–2011 (d). The developing regions are aggregated into 6
regions, as shown in Supplementary Table 3. Columns show the contributions of different driving factors
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China produces for the rich developed countries sustained,
China’s embodied emissions grew largely by producing for the
poor developing populations.
Emissions embodied in India’s imports from other developing
regions also grew three-fold from 44Mt in 2004 to 135Mt in
2011. Intermediate products accounted for a large proportion
(71%) of the total CO2 emissions embodied in such imports.
Heavy industrial products (e.g., chemicals and preliminary
processed metal) dominate Indian intermediate imports increase.
India imports large amount of ﬁnal products from China from
Hi-tech and heavy industry sectors. Embodied emissions in
Indian ﬁnal products import from China reached 25Mt in 2011
(Fig. 3b), which has increased by 21Mt since 2004 (Supplemen-
tary Fig. 3).
Of the 165Mt of India’s CO2 emissions embodied in export,
68% were embodied in intermediate products and 32% in ﬁnal
products. Indian intermediate products forms product basis for
further processing in other developing countries. Final products
have been traded to global South, except China. This implies that
India starts to compete with China as a manufacturer for other
developing regions, while India required importing higher value
added products from China. In particular, the emissions
embodied in China’s exports to Middle East and North Africa
increased by 54Mt from 2004 to 2007, but dropped to 33Mt
from 2007 to 2011. By contrast, the emissions embodied in India’s
exports to Middle East and North Africa increased by 15Mt and
21Mt during the period 2004–2007 and 2007–2011, respectively.
This is mainly because of decline in export volume change’s
contribution from China (pink and red) and a double increase of
that from India (Supplementary Fig. 2).
China’s change as an export platform. Although China’s man-
ufacturing base continues to grow, the rate has tapered in recent
years. Because of rising labor costs in China, low-end manu-
facturers plan to relocate lower-cost foreign economies in the
coming years24. For example, labor-intensive and resource-
intensive production of textiles and apparels has already begun
shifting from China to other Asian countries such as Bangladesh
and Vietnam25, 26. This shift is evidenced by increasing CO2
emissions embodied in textiles exported from other Asia and
Paciﬁc regions which rose by an annual rate of 21–22% during
2004–2011 (Fig. 4). In particular, countries like Bangladesh and
Vietnam, were able to accumulate their embodied emissions in
textiles exports by 175% and 236% between 2004 and 2011 (from
0.61 and 0.86Mt to 1.68 and 2.89 Mt), respectively. The growth
rate of emissions embodied in China’s exported textile decreased
from an average of 8% per year in the period 2004–2007 to 5%
per year in the period 2007–2011 (Fig. 4). By contrast, the
emissions embodied in textiles imported to China changed in
the opposite trend, decreased at an annual rate of 9% in the
period of 2004–2007 but a slight increased 1% per year in the
period of 2007–2011 (Supplementary Fig. 4).
Businesses looking for low-cost production are increasingly
considering countries other than China, particularly South and
Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and
Thailand. Emissions embodied in exports from several Chinese
industry sectors (e.g., textiles and wearing apparel, ferrous metals)
have grown slowly or even decreased since 2004, while emissions
embodied in India’s, other Asia and Paciﬁc’s exports still have an
increasing and high growth rate, respectively (see details in
Supplementary Data 1). Although foreign direct investment (FDI)
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Fig. 3 Magnitude and composition of emissions embodied in trade between developing regions in 2011. The sectors are the aggregation of 57 sectors and
details are shown in Supplementary Table 4. Bars show the balance of CO2 emissions embodied in trade between developing regions and China (a) and India
(b). Colors indicate the sectors of traded products, with ﬁnal and intermediate products differentiated by both the intensity of shading and separate bars
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ﬂows to China doubled from 2004 and reached a record level of
$124 billion in 2011, ﬂows to the services sector surpassed those
to manufacturing for the ﬁrst time27. FDI to India grew six-fold
from 2004 to 2011 and is expected to increase faster than China.
Overall, China continues to be in the top spot as investors’
preferred destination for FDI28, but the rising wages and
production costs will enhance the relative competitiveness of
South and Southeast Asian countries in manufacturing.
Changes in Chinese manufacturing are being driven by rising
labor cost, as well as rising real estate costs and stricter
environmental regulations. China is also intentionally transition-
ing to a more service-based economy, so that tax-related
incentives for manufacturing are becoming increasingly difﬁcult
to obtain. Meanwhile, nations such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Thailand, and others are building critical mass and beginning to
attract more businesses. Although China may no longer be the
lowest-cost export platform, it will likely continue attracting
manufacturing investment to serve domestic consumers and
possibly riches from global South and to support a shift toward
higher-value manufactured goods29, 30. For example, the annual
growth rate of emissions embodied in electronic equipment
increased from 5% between 2004 and 2007 to 8% between 2007
and 2011.
The carbon intensity of China’s economy (CO2 emissions per
unit of GDP) decreased by 27% from 2004 to 2015 (Supplemen-
tary Table 2), reﬂecting a shift away from low-value-added
manufacturing. Indeed, a 6.5% decrease in Chinese coal
consumption over the period 2013–2015 underpins the ﬂattening
of global CO2 emissions since 201331–33. However, the carbon
intensity of the next phase of global economic development will
determine whether ambitious climate targets such as stabilizing at
2 °C will be met, and our ﬁndings depict the nascent rise of
energy-intensive and emissions-intensive production activities in
other Asian countries such as Vietnam and Pakistan. Thus, even
as the share of coal in China’s energy consumption fell, the share
in India and other developing Asian countries increased by 9.3%
and 10%, respectively, between 2013 and 201534. The success of
the Paris Agreement and international climate mitigation efforts
may therefore depend on curtailing growth of coal-based energy
and emissions in now-industrializing and urbanizing countries35.
Otherwise, countries like China and India may meet their
nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris
Agreement36, 37 by hollowing out low-value, energy-intensive
manufacturing, and offshoring those activities to emerging
markets elsewhere in Asia with less stringent climate policy
measures. The consumption-induced or weak carbon leakage due
to comparative advantage may be extended to policy-induced or
strong carbon leakage in response to the different climate
policies38. Reducing such carbon leakage among developing
nations and successfully mitigating climate change thus urgently
depends on decarbonizing not only energy systems in developed
countries but also the entire process of industrialization39.
Methods
Emissions embodied in trade. Originally developed by Leontief40, environmental
input-output analyses (EIOs)40 have been widely used to illustrate the economy-
wide environmental repercussions triggered by economic activities. By extending
EIOs to multi-regions, emissions embodied in bilateral trade (EEBT) enables to
determine the interconnection of sectors in different regions with respect to
environmental changes and is suitable for analyzing bilateral relationship14, 41, 42.
EEBT methods considers the total exports from a country covering all intermediate
and ﬁnal products. Here, we use the global multi-regional input-output tables of
2004, 2007 and 2011 to estimate the emissions from the production of traded
products14, 43. For each region, the monetary balance is
xr ¼ Zr þ yr þ
X
s
ers 
X
s
esr ð1Þ
where xr is a vector for sectoral total outputs in region r; Zr represents the domestic
and imported industry requirements in region r; yr is the ﬁnal demand (household,
government and investment) in region r of domestic and imported products;ers is
the exports from region r to region s (r≠s) and esr is the imports in region r from
region s. In EEBT, imports are removed from Zrand yr to focus on the domestic
production only44:
xr ¼ Zrr þ yrr þ
X
s
ers ð2Þ
where imports to r are expressed as
mr ¼
X
s
esr ¼
X
s
Zsr þ
X
s
ysr ð3Þ
The total direct and indirect domestic emissions to produce a unit of ﬁnal con-
sumption is
hr ¼ FrðI ArrÞ1 ð4Þ
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Fig. 4 Annual changes in emissions embodied in selected types of exported products to the rest of World. Lines show relative changes in the emissions
embodied in different types of products exported by China (a), India (b), and other Asia and Paciﬁc region (c). See details of in Supplementary Data 1
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where Fr is the direct emission intensity in region r, which is calculated by each
sector’s CO2 emissions divided by the sector’s total output x45. The CO2 emissions
used in this study rely on data from the GTAP which reﬂects the use of energy and
fossil fuels by each region sector. The emissions are reduced by 9% for the agri-
culture and industry sectors according to our previous study46. To extend the
coverage of emission data, we also include emissions from cement production,
which is attributed to sector of Non-Metallic Minerals47. L= (I−A)−1 is the
Leontief inverse matrix, which captures both direct and indirect inputs to satisfy
one unit of ﬁnal demand in monetary value, (I–Arr)−1only consider the domestic
supply chain in region r.
The total direct and indirect emissions in region r to produce the products
which are exported to region s are
Trs ¼ FrðI ArrÞ1ers ð5Þ
Structural decomposition analysis. Index decomposition analyses (IDAs) and
structural decomposition analyses (SDAs) are two decomposition methods that are
widely used to quantify the driving factors of a dependent variable, such as energy
consumption or CO2 emissions. SDAs enable us to distinguish a range of production
effects and ﬁnal consumption effects that IDAs fail to capture48–50, and they are
capable of assessing both direct and indirect effects along the entire supply chain51.
The typical SDA can quantify the degree of change in emission transfers among
regions when only the trade structure increases and all other factors remain the
same51. SDAs can decompose the bilateral emission transfers into changes in con-
stituent parts. In our analysis, these constituent parts are emission intensity, pro-
duction structure, export structure, export per capita and population effect12, 19, 52, 53.
Previous studies have applied a similar SDA approach to determine the
underlying factors affecting increases in China’s consumption-based CO2
emissions12 or China’s emissions from production of exported-product52. Clearly,
emissions embodied in trade have played an increasingly important role in regional
CO2 emissions in a globalizing world; however, insufﬁcient attention has been paid
to the driving forces of bilateral emission transfers, especially the developing
regions, which are the focuses of our study.
The total emissions in region r to produce the products which are exported to
region s can be expressed as follows:
Trs ¼ FrðI ArrÞ1ers
¼P
i
P
j
f ri L
rr
ij
ersj
ers
ers
Pr P
r
¼P
i
P
j
f ri L
rr
ij S
rs
j M
rsPr
ð6Þ
where Pr and Mrs can reﬂect the change in export volume, which is population in
region r and export volume per capita from region r to region s, respectively; ersj is
the share of the export of products in sector j from region r to region s in the total
exports from region r to region s; Lrrij indicates the total inputs from sector i to
produce one unit of output in sector j in region r;, and f ri is the emissions for a unit
of output in sector i in region r.
Thus, the change in the bilateral emission transfers between two points in time
(indicated by the subscripts 0 and 1) can be expressed as ΔTrs=T1rs−T0rs. However,
a unique solution for the decomposition is not available18, 21, 54, 55. For the case of
m factors, the number of possible complete decompositions without any residual
terms is equal tom!18. Because of large numbers of sectors and regions in this study,
we follow the methods of previous studies and use the average of the so-called polar
decompositions as an approximation of the average of all m! decompositions12, 18.
The two polar decompositions (ΔTars and ΔTbrs) are as follows:
ΔTrsa ¼
P
i
P
j
ðΔf ri ÞLrrij1Srsj1Mrs1 Pr1 þ
P
i
P
j
f ri0ðΔLrrij ÞSrsj1Mrs1 Pr1
þP
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f ri0L
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ij0ðΔSrsj ÞMrs1 Pr1 þ
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f ri0L
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j0ðΔMrsÞPr1
þP
i
P
j
f ri0L
rr
ij0S
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0 ðΔPrÞ
¼Δfa þ ΔLa þ ΔSa þ ΔMa þ ΔPa
ð7Þ
ΔTrsb ¼
P
i
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j
ðΔf ri ÞLrrij0Srsj0Mrs0 Pr0 þ
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i
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j
f ri1ðΔLrrij ÞSrsj0Mrs0 Pr0
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ij1S
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1 ðΔPrÞ
¼ Δfb þ ΔLb þ ΔSb þ ΔMb þ ΔPb
ð8Þ
The average of the polar decomposition is determined as follows18:
ΔTrs ¼ 12 ðΔTrsa þ ΔTrsb Þ
¼ 12 ðΔfa þ ΔfbÞ þ 12 ðΔLa þ ΔLbÞ þ 12 ðΔSa þ ΔSbÞ
þ 12 ðΔMa þ ΔMbÞ þ 12 ðΔPa þ ΔPbÞ
¼ Δf þ ΔLþ ΔSþ ΔM þ ΔP
ð9Þ
where ΔTrs is the growth in bilateral emission transfers between two points in time,
which in this study was from 2004 to 2007 and from 2007 to 2011; and Δf, ΔL, ΔSa,
ΔM, and ΔP refer to the emission intensity effect, production structure effect,
export structure effect, export per capita, and population effect, respectively.
Data sources. The economic input-output data, population, energy consumption
and CO2 emissions of each sector are all based on version 9 of the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP) database56. These include six developing regions of the
global South: China, India, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Other Asia and Paciﬁc; and other (mostly
developed) regions of U.S.-North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, and developed Asia-Paciﬁc regions (Supplementary
Table 1 and Data 2)12, 18–20.
The economic data from the GTAP database are in current prices (US dollars),
and to remove the impact of inﬂation on the monetary output, we use the
appropriate producer price index (PPI) to adjust all of the monetary data to
provide a consistent analysis from 2004 to 2011. The PPI can be derived from
pricing data for seven categories published by National Account Main Aggregates
Database57, which are mapped to 57 sectors of global Multi-regional Input-output
table (Supplementary Table 5). Emissions from fossil fuel combustion by each
region are from GTAP database56, and emission from cement production is from
Andrew47. We are aware that China’s CO2 emissions are derived from various
sources; thus, we lowered the fossil fuel CO2 emissions from agriculture and
industry in China by 9% according to our previous studies46, 58. Our analysis is
global and includes 129 regions (Supplementary Data 2), and the detailed results
are aggregated into 10 regions based on geography and economic levels
(Supplementary Table 3) for ease of understanding.
Data availability. All the original data can be obtained from given data sources.
Supplementary Data 1 is annual changes in emissions embodied in exports in
selected regions. Supplementary Data 2 is the deﬁnition of regions. Supplementary
Data 3 is South–South transfers of embodied emissions in 2004, 2007, and 2011. All
datasets generated during this study are available from the corresponding author
on reasonable request.
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